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PUBLIC OPINION AND THE INTERNET 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract:   The article considers the impact of the “world wide web” on the 
formation of public opinion. Public opinion in the form of peer opinion emerged as 
important in collegial societies in the eighteenth century. Editorial opinion became 
crucial in the context of the organizational societies of the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Web-driven opinion belongs to a “self-organizing” society. Such 
a society retains aspects of peer dialogue. It also incorporates forms of traditional 
network media built around the push technologies of broadcasting and centralized 
mass distribution. But it adds to this repertoire a new kind of technology—a pull 
technology—where user-driven searches of billions of self-published pages archived 
on the Web complement, and in part replace, both dialogic and centralized network 
media. The article considers how, under these conditions, opinion becomes less a 
matter of shaping peer belief or mass convictions than of shaping tacit collective 
“autopoietic” structures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The development of the “world wide web” has had a significant impact on the 
formation of public opinion in democratic societies. This impact, though, has not been 
exactly that predicted by early 1990s prophets of the Web, who expected a 
decentralization of traditional mass media. If anything, the easy accessibility of the 
web-enabled Internet (hereafter “the Net”) has extended the audience reach of 
traditional network media. Despite this, the Net is fundamentally changing the nature 
of public opinion.  
One should be wary of thinking of this change as a technology-enabled 
extension of the nineteenth-century liberal public. In the liberal view, the Net is a 
difficult-to-control free speech medium. It engenders a babble of voices devoted to 
persuading citizens and governments of the merits and otherwise of laws and policies. 
Because the Web’s infrastructure of servers is global, dictatorial—or even legal— 
control of it is difficult to achieve. This is especially true for governments that want to 
encourage the pragmatic benefits of computer-mediated commerce.  
Yet, to see the Net simply as a free speech medium does not do full justice to 
its nature. It began life as a powerful document delivery system, and, in important 
ways, its long-term impact on public opinion derives from that fact. The Web 
leveraged existing inter-networked computing to enable a new way of creating, 
collecting, storing, transforming, and disseminating documents and information 
objects. The frothy activity of instant commentary and interest group campaigning 
that the Net facilitates disguises the extent to which the logic of the public sphere is 
undergoing a long-term paradigmatic shift shaped by its origins as a document 
archive.          
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BACKGROUND 
The architect of this dynamic document archive was Tim Berners-Lee 
(Berners-Lee, 1999; Naughton, 1999). In 1980, Berners-Lee began work as consultant 
at CERN, the international particle research body located near Geneva. CERN was a 
“city of turnover”. Its principal social characteristic was a transient population. 
Visiting physicists who came and went did much of the center’s experimentation. 
Scientists on average stayed two years. The problem that resulted was how to 
maintain good documentation tracking when staff turnover was so high. Berners-Lee 
set out to solve this problem. 
His first attempt was to create a program called ENQUIRE (1980), which he 
dubbed a “memory substitute”. He filled documents with words which, when 
highlighted, would lead to other documents. This was similar to the Apple Macintosh 
HyperCard. This application in its turn borrowed the hypertext concept from Ted 
Nelson (Nelson, 1992). Hypertext conceived information as connection or linkage. 
Berners-Lee adapted this idea to create the beginnings of a publicly accessible archive 
of documents. The archive was initially restricted to CERN. In 1989, however, 
Berners-Lee conceived a plan for a universal document system. Universal meant 
global. The idea was to use a mix of hypertext and networked computing to link all 
documents and information objects in the world. The idea of a universal system was a 
conceptual break-through. A universal system meant there would be no central control 
or source of information—whether in the sense of a centralized undemocratic 
hierarchy or else a democratic hub-and-spoke network. Universal also meant the 
potential integration of all information systems. 
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Berners-Lee had another powerful idea. He thought that a universal 
information system should mean not only universal access to and retrieval of 
documents but also the universal capacity to publish documents. He insisted (against 
the opposition of peers) that this should be a system in which anyone using a 
hypertext editor could publish a linked document. The hypertext editor was the 
forerunner of the HTML editor. Andries van Dam had created the first functional 
hypertext editor in 1967 at Brown University. 
In 1990, Berners-Lee got support from CERN senior managers for what had 
been to that date virtually a private project. He created a program called a “browser” 
that provided a virtual “window” through which a user saw a web of linked resources 
on the existing “inter-net” (i.e., the existing inter-network of networked computers 
that had grown up since the 1970s). His small team also created a “web server”, based 
on the client-server model. He envisaged a system in which information would be 
stored on networked computer servers. Client programs (browsers) running on other 
networked computers would access these servers. 
How would the information be extracted from these servers? One option was 
to use existing technology such as TELNET or FTP. A second more powerful idea 
was that of the “inter-face”. This concept came from the hypertext community. An 
inter-face was a “window” that displayed the structure of the virtual space of linked 
texts. Originally, node-link diagrams represented this structure. The first browsers 
were not graphical. Graphical interfaces came later. Marc Andressen’s 1993 Mosaic 
browser was the first with the standard graphical interface of windows, graphics, and 
point and click functionality. 
Berner-Lee’s desire for universality meant that he had to ensure that public 
information on any networked computer anywhere in the world could be accessed 
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through the browser. To achieve this end, Berners-Lee devised a set of protocols by 
which different machines could talk to each other and exchange information. One 
protocol specified the location of information. It was like an IP address. A second 
protocol for information exchange between machines was modeled on FTP. This was 
the HTTP (Hypertext Transport Protocol). A third protocol established a uniform way 
of structuring documents: Hypertext Mark-up Language (HTML). HTML was based 
on SGML (Standard Generalized Mark-up Language) already used in the electronic 
publishing world. It provided conventions for attaching tags to pages. 
 
CRITICAL ISSUES: FROM PEERS TO AUTOPOIESIS 
The result of Berners-Lee’s architecture was a cheap, quick, and reliable 
system for accessing, retrieving, and publishing documents. Any person with access 
to the Internet in principle could look at any document stored on a web server (unless 
it resided on a secure server where access was intentionally limited). A person with 
some web server space could publish any documents they liked on the Internet, as 
long as they had some simple knowledge of HTML page creation.  
What followed from this were two major consequences for public opinion. 
The first was that anyone with a relatively simple set of tools could publish their own 
opinions. On the web, these opinions were accessible to anyone anywhere in the 
world with access to a computer and an Internet Service Provider. 
Computer-mediated universal access and self-publishing created a new kind of 
public sphere. They also created a new set of justice and equity problems. Not 
everyone can afford access, and certainly not unlimited access, to the Internet. Indeed 
most of the world does not have a telephone connection, let alone a computer or an 
ISP account. But, then, also most of the world has never participated in public opinion 
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formation of any kind. In the still limited number of countries where there is a history 
of strong public spheres, programs sponsored by governments and private foundations 
emerged in order to overcome access inequalities. Widespread provision of 
computing by companies and educational institutions also facilitated access to the 
new digital public as well. “Stealing time” from institutions for public and private Net 
activity emerged in the well-endowed democracies as a “quasi entitlement”—creating 
dilemmas for organizations as to “when and where and how” to encourage or 
discourage such tacit activity. 
In democratic societies with long-established publics, and a correlative strong 
propensity to create intellectual wealth, virtually all social groups and classes have 
directly or indirectly benefited from the increasing access to information made 
possible by the Net. At the other end of the political spectrum, the Net has posed 
significant dilemmas for dictatorial governments. Their first instinct has been to 
censor Web materials. However, censorship is difficult to apply to the Net, because 
material is published on thousands of web servers in hundreds of countries. 
Dictatorial states instead discourage access to computer hardware, the setting up of 
ISPs, and the local publication of sites. However, as the Net is also a major scientific 
and commercial medium, with implications for trade and military science, such 
controls also hurt a state’s economic and technology performance. 
In contrast to crude dictatorships, authoritarian states like China have sought 
to preserve the economic and scientific advantages of the Net, while discouraging free 
speech and restricting freedom of information. Such states encourage user accounts 
while maintaining a state monopoly over government documents, blocking access to a 
relative handful of politically sensitive international news and government sites, and 
closing down local opposition sites. These measures alone cannot prevent individuals 
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browsing critical materials. Thus authoritarian states have come to rely heavily on the 
strategy of self-censorship. They rely on the fear of web users that the government 
may find out about, and punish them, for visiting sites that the government 
disapproves of. Users are aware that it is difficult to erase all traces of such activity 
from a computer’s hard drive. Packet sniffing, keystroke monitoring and inspection of 
logs allow systems administrators to audit unauthorized activity on network 
computers. But monitoring all Net activity would be insanely labor intensive, and thus 
self-defeating for any government. Therefore authoritarian states depend on their 
population using the Net for social communication (for chat) but not for political 
communication. A government might occasionally audit the immensely popular chat 
rooms, but so long as users avoid explicit political comment the state has no further 
interest in what is being said.  
The success of the strategy of self-censorship has been one of the reasons that 
the Net has not proved to be the kind of libertarian force that its prophets in the mid-
1990s expected it to be. However, authoritarian state strategies are not the only reason 
for this. A lot of the Net’s supposed power to shape public opinion is overstated. Take 
the much-touted ability of Net users to post opinions on the Web. Anyone in a 
democratic state with modest resources and motivation can publish more or less what 
ever they like, more or less where-ever they are, and at any time. The popularity of 
blogs (web logs), video postings, threaded discussions, relay chat, and so on are 
testament to this. However, often this means little more in practice than that the Net is 
a powerful expressive medium. It allows no-holds-barred statements of opinions and 
views. Other Net users, though, can just as easily ignore these. Cohorts involved in 
threaded discussions typically have difficulty sustaining dialogues. It is striking how 
minimally interactive much supposed interactive discussion actually is (Davies, 2003: 
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37-38). Expression on the Net is often mistaken for discussion. This phenomenon has 
significant implications for the Net as a medium of public opinion. 
Net citizens, or netizens (Hauben, 1997), have difficulty sustaining arguments 
with political opponents. They quickly drift off topic. They don’t engage with each 
other. History can help us understand why this is so. Peer-based formation of public 
opinion emerged in the eighteenth century (Habermas, 1991; Gouldner, 1976). It 
arose out of face-to-face debates that had been released from the constraints of 
traditional social hierarchies. Coffee houses and the houses of parliament in London 
were crucial to this development. In this setting, we see public opinion formed 
through the arguments of peers. Peers have no social authority to compel others to 
agree with their opinions. As in a jury room, they have to garner agreement by 
reasoning. In eighteenth-century England, newspapers recorded the debates of peers. 
Thanks to existence of an effective postal service, the reports of these debates could 
be sent to the provinces. Debate between peers meant that public opinion was shaped 
by feedback. Statements were made, and others responded to them. Responses in turn 
were responded to, as the pitch of debate increased. 
It is an illusion to think that the Net functions like this. It has many powerful 
tools to facilitate interactive responses—from discussion boards to email. But the 
ability of these tools to reach anyone with an email address also means that the 
technology contradicts the small-scale logic of peer debates. The greatest extent of 
one’s peers is around 150-200 people. Yet the Net allows everyone in the world to be 
one’s peer. Peer-style feedback cannot function meaningfully on that scale. 
Cybernetic models of feedback may work for machine self-regulation (Weiner, 1948) 
but not for opinion articulation.  
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The world scale of the Net is the result of a longer historical process in which 
the small scale of peer debate has been subsumed by larger-scale processes of public 
opinion formation. From the mid-nineteenth century, telegraphic (and later telephony) 
networks permitted news services to transmit opinion samples to news organizations 
with great speed and “from anywhere to anywhere” served by these networks. 
Correspondingly, newspapers developed editorial formula to communicate with a 
mass audience, in place of peer audiences. The rise of the organization society and its 
generic ideologies—such as liberalism and socialism—abetted this development. 
Communication became a professional activity. With the development of radio and 
television networks, formula-driven reports could be instantly transmitted to a mass 
audience. The public opinion that developed in this context was formed through the 
gatekeeping of competing news organizations. How opinions were collected, edited, 
and redistributed through networks of public broadcasters and private media 
companies was crucial to their eventual shape. 
The third, most recent, stage of public opinion emerged with the Web in the 
1990s. Gatekeeper publishing organizations have a strong presence on the Net. Peer-
to-peer forums and tools are also widely available and well supported. However, the 
key innovation of the Net is that virtually anyone with a basic skill set and modest 
resources can publish their own material. They can “post” material to a URL 
(Universal Resource Location) address. Each byte of data in a computer memory has 
a numeric address. Addresses allow data to be located. The model of the Net as an 
addressable medium was initially derived from Von Neumann’s computer 
architecture (Bolter, 1984; Floridi, 1999). The idea of the numeric addressing of space 
ultimately derives from Descartes. Long before computing, it underpinned the modern 
concept of a postal service with its numeric street addresses and zip codes. When 
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Berners-Lee adapted this “reading, writing, addressing, and posting” technology, what 
we ended up with was individuals being able to “post” a document to a public 
computer address that anyone could browse. As long as a person was motivated to 
search for the document that might be located at any of millions of addresses, and as 
long they had some search skills and tools, they could locate the document.  
What the “public post” model is geared to is not peer-to-peer communication 
but archival transmission. It is not governed by the judgment of professional editorial 
gatekeepers but by self-publishers. This begs the question: how is public opinion 
formed in the age of addressable media? 
One answer to this question is that addressable media do not support the type 
of collective public opinion typical of the age of large media organizations. Partly this 
is because of the reduction in the influence of editorial filtering mechanisms that can 
shape such an opinion. Partly this is because collective opinion is simply less 
important to democratic functioning in a cybernetic society in contrast to the growth 
of self-regulating systems. One of the most important examples of a self-regulated 
system is the Net itself. What counts is not its capacity for broadcasting opinion, or 
for stimulating mutual dialogue. What is crucial is its capacity to post, archive, and 
retrieve opinion in a self-regulating way. The Net makes us re-think the very nature of 
opinion.         
The Net is a self-organizing or autopoietic system. The classic example of 
such a system is the city (Johnson, 2001; Murphy, 2001, 2003; Jacobs, 1985). For 
example, the way that traffic flows in a city exists independently not only of each 
driver’s desires but even of the intentions of the most foresighted planner. Little that 
happens in cities is explicitly legislated, yet city life is shaped by powerful patterns 
well understood by its denizens. Scale, symmetry, proportionality, and economy 
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generate many of these anonymous forms. They can last for generations. Some of the 
patterns of Rome, for example, have persisted for over 2,000 years. Such patterns 
often prove highly palatable to city dwellers. They make good use of them to generate 
their own incremental additions to city life.  
The Net operates much like a city. We can begin to understand why this is so 
if we look again at Berners-Lee’s original design for the Web. He designed it to 
archive documents. Its purpose was to transmit science documents over time. 
Scientists who left CERN could archive their papers so that they would be readily 
available to incoming researchers. The model of this was neither the debating forum 
of scientific peers, nor was it the office newsletter. What emerged from the initial 
design of the web was a giant Alexandrine-like archive. The things that characterize 
the archive are:  
 
1. It is driven by the self-publishing and self-organizing efforts of its 
contributing parts. No contributing part (individual, group, or 
organization) has much influence measured against the whole of 
the Net. No contributing part can be a gatekeeper for the whole. 
There is not an editorial “ghost in the machine” to regulate the 
system. Likewise, the archive has no peer bodies (for example, a 
Senate or Dr. Johnson-style clubs) where public opinion is 
decisively shaped.  
2. In self-organizing systems what counts is the long-term 
transmission of pattern and structure. Generations come and go, 
endless changes are made, and yet through all of the changes 
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certain patterns persist. The contribution of each part belongs to a 
larger scheme of things. 
3. Each part has difficulty comprehending the whole of the archive, 
but each contributor nonetheless still understands something of its 
tacit architecture. 
4. This architecture, like all great architecture, is simple. With a few 
elementary pattern-ideas, beginning in the case of the Net with a 
few protocols, a complex structure is created. 
5. Other patterns emerge spontaneously—like the Zipf distributions or 
“power law” of the Net;  
6. Like a city, sight and sound and movement are as important to the 
Net as text is. Correspondingly, opinion that lasts is as much 
characterized by its composition and design as by its peer 
standpoint or its generic ideology. 
7. Such an autopoietic system allows millions of persons to contribute 
to it. The nature and meaning of the system remains independent of 
the intentions, beliefs or opinions of any and all of the contributors. 
Like a city, the autopoietic archive has a character separate from its 
makers.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Peer opinions emerged as important in the collegial societies of the eighteenth 
century. Editorial opinion became crucial in the context of the organizational societies 
of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As it entered the era of the archive, 
opinion assumed the time-scale of autopoietic systems. This is “the thousand-year 
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scale of the metropolis” (Johnson, 2001, p. 99). The future lasts a long time. The 
power of such an archive is transmissive rather communicative (Debray, 2000; 
Vandenberghe, 2007). The thing that matters is not the communicative interaction of 
peers, or mass communication, but transmission across time.  
Transmissive power is measured in decades, centuries, and even millennia. 
The medium of the Net has exceptional capacity to instantly send, retrieve, and self-
publish material. Yet the ultimate logic of the Net is to preserve and transmit those 
documents and objects over time. An understanding of large-scale transmissive 
systems, and their role in shaping autopoietic societies, is still sketchy. It remains a 
key topic for future research.  
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